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Template:Infobox Law enforcement agency The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) (Template:Lang-ru; Federal'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii) is the main domestic security agency of the Russian Federation and the main successor agency of the Soviet-era Cheka, NKVD and KGB.

The FSB is involved in counter-intelligence, internal and border security, counter-terrorism, and surveillance. Its headquarters are on Lubyanka Square, downtown Moscow, the same location as the former headquarters of the KGB.

The Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK) was the predecessor of the FSB. A bill calling for the reorganization, expansion and renaming of FSK passed both houses of the Russian parliament and was signed into law on 3 April 1995, by Boris Yeltsin. It was made subordinate to the Ministry of Justice by presidential decree on 9 March 2004.[1] These events marked the creation of the FSB.



Lubyanka, headquarters of the FSB

The FSB is engaged mostly in domestic affairs, while espionage duties were taken over by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (former First Chief Directorate of the KGB). However, the FSB also includes the FAPSI agency, which conducts electronic surveillance abroad. All law enforcement and intelligence agencies in Russia work under the guidance of FSB, if needed. For example, the GRU, spetsnaz and Internal Troops detachments of Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs work together with the FSB in Chechnya.

The FSB is responsible for internal security of the Russian state, counterespionage, and the fight against organized crime, terrorism, and drug smuggling. The FSB combines functions and powers similar to those exercised by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Protective Service, the Secret Service, the National Security Agency (NSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection, United States Coast Guard, and Drug Enforcement Administration. FSB also commands a contingent of Internal Troops, spetsnaz, and an extensive network of civilian informants.[2] The number of FSB personnel and its budget remain state secrets, although the budget was reported to jump nearly 40% in 2006.[3]


Initial reorganization of the KGB[]

Main article: KGB

During the late 1980s, as the Soviet government and economy were disintegrating, the KGB survived better than most state institutions, suffering far fewer cuts in its personnel and budget. Following the attempted coup of 1991 (in which some KGB units participated)[4] against Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, the KGB was dismantled and formally ceased to exist from November 1991.[5]

In late 1991 the domestic security functions of the KGB were reconstituted as the Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK), which was placed under the control of the president. The FSK had been known initially for some time as the Ministry of Security. In 1995, the FSK was renamed and reorganized into the FSB by the Federal Law of 3 April 1995, "On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation", granting it additional powers, enabling it to enter private homes and to conduct intelligence activities in Russia as well as abroad in cooperation with the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[6]

The FSB reforms were rounded out by decree No. 633, signed by Boris Yeltsin on 23 June 1995. The decree made the tasks of the FSB more specific, giving the FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work, and described the powers of the FSB director. The number of deputy directors was increased to 8: 2 first deputies, 5 deputies responsible for departments and directorates and 1 deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate. Yeltsin appointed Colonel-General Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov as the new director of the FSB.

In 1998 Yeltsin appointed as director of the FSB Vladimir Putin, a KGB veteran who would later succeed Yeltsin as federal president.[7] Yeltsin also ordered the FSB to expand its operations against labor unions in Siberia and to crack down on right-wing dissidents. As president, Putin increased the FSB's powers to include countering foreign intelligence operations, fighting organized crime, and suppressing Chechen separatists.


On 17 June 2000, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree, according to which the FSB was supposed to have a director, a first deputy director and eight other deputy directors, including one stats-secretary and the chiefs of six departments (Economic Security Department, Counterintelligence Department, Organizational and Personnel Service, Department of activity provision, Department for Analysis, Forecasting and Strategic Planning, Department for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism). On 11 June 2001, the President introduced one more deputy director position.

According to a decree signed by Putin on 11 March 2003, by 1 July Border Guard Service of Russia had been transferred to FSB while FAPSI, agency of government telecommunications, had been abolished, granting FSB with a major part of its functions.

On 12 August 2003 Putin allowed the FSB to have three first deputy directors, including the Chief of the Border Guard Service (Vladimir Pronichev), and specified that a deputy director position must be assumed by the Chief of the Inspection Directorate. On 11 July 2004, the President reorganized FSB again.[8] It was prescribed to have a director, two first deputy directors (Sergei Smirnov and Vladimir Pronichev, one of whom should be the Chief of the Border Guard Service (Pronichev).

On 2 December 2005, Putin authorized FSB to have one more deputy director. This position was assumed by Vladimir Bulavin on 3 March 2006.

In the beginning of 2006 the Italian news agency ANSA reported the publication on the FSB website of an offer, open to Russian citizens working as spies for a foreign country, to work as double agents.

In September 2006, the FSB was shaken by a major reshuffle, which, combined with some earlier reassignments (most remarkably, those of FSB Deputy Directors Yury Zaostrovtsev and Vladimir Anisimov in 2004 and 2005, respectively), were widely believed to be linked to the Three Whales Corruption Scandal that had slowly unfolded since 2000. Some analysts considered it to be an attempt to undermine FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev's influence, as it was Patrushev's team from the Karelian KGB Directorate of the late 1980s – early 1990s that had suffered most and he had been on vacations during the event.[9][10][11]



Then-FSB Director Nikolay Kovalev said in 1996: "There has never been such a number of spies arrested by us since the time when German agents were sent in during the years of World War II." The FSB reported that around 400 foreign intelligence agents were uncovered in 1995 and 1996.[12] In 2006 the FSB reported about 27 foreign intelligence officers and 89 foreign agents whose activities were stopped.[13]

An increasing number of scientists have been accused of espionage and illegal technology exports by FSB during the last decade: researcher Igor Sutyagin,[14] physicist Valentin Danilov,[15] physical chemist Oleg Korobeinichev,[16] academician Oskar Kaibyshev,[17] and physicist Yury Ryzhov.[18] Some other widely covered cases of political prosecution include investigator Mikhail Trepashkin[19] and journalist Vladimir Rakhmankov.[20] All these people are either under arrest or serve long jail sentences.

Ecologist and journalist Alexander Nikitin, who worked with the Bellona Foundation, was accused of espionage. He published material exposing hazards posed by the Russian Navy's nuclear fleet. He was acquitted in 1999 after spending several years in prison (his case was sent for re-investigation 13 times while he remained in prison). Other cases of prosecution are the cases of investigative journalist and ecologist Grigory Pasko,[21][22] Vladimir Petrenko who described danger posed by military chemical warfare stockpiles, and Nikolay Shchur, chairman of the Snezhinskiy Ecological Fund.[12]

Other arrested people include Viktor Orekhov, a former KGB officer who assisted Soviet dissidents, Vladimir Kazantsev who disclosed illegal purchases of eavesdropping devices from foreign firms, and Vil Mirzayanov who had written that Russia was working on a nerve gas weapon.[12]


Over the years, FSB and affiliated state security organizations have killed all "presidents" of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria including Dzhokhar Dudaev, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, Aslan Maskhadov, and Abdul-Khalim Saidullaev. Just before his death, Saidullaev claimed that the Russian government "treacherously" killed Maskhadov, after inviting him to "talks" and promising his security "at the highest level."[23]

During the Moscow theater hostage crisis and Beslan school hostage crisis, all hostage takers were killed on the spot by FSB spetsnaz forces. Only one of the suspects, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, survived and was convicted later by the court. It is reported that more than 100 leaders of terrorist groups have been killed during 119 operations on North Caucasus during 2006.[13]

On 28 July 2006 the FSB presented a list of 17 terrorist organizations recognized by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, to Rossiyskaya Gazeta newspaper, which published the list that day. The list had been available previously, but only through individual request.[24][25] Commenting on the list, Yuri Sapunov, head of anti-terrorism at the FSB, named three main criteria necessary for organizations to be listed.[26]

Border protection[]

The Federal Border Guard Service (FPS) has been part of the FSB since 2003. Russia has Template:Convert of sea and land borders, Template:Convert of which is with Kazakhstan, and Template:Convert with China. One kilometer (1,100 yd) of border protection costs around 1 million rubles per year. Vladimir Putin called on the FPS to increase the fight against international terrorism and "destroy terrorists like rats".[27]

Export control[]

The FSB is engaged in the development of Russia's export control strategy and examines drafts of international agreements related to the transfer of dual-use and military commodities and technologies. Its primary role in the nonproliferation sphere is to collect information to prevent the illegal export of controlled nuclear technology and materials.[28]


Template:Update Structure of the Federal Office (incomplete):

  • Counterintelligence Service (Department) - chiefs: Oleg Syromolotov (since Aug 2000), Valery Pechyonkin (September 1997 – August 2000)
    • Directorate for the Counterintelligence Support of Strategic Facilities
    • Military Counterintelligence Directorate — chiefs: Alexander Bezverkhny (at least since 2002), Vladimir Petrishchev (since January 1996)
  • Service (Department) for Protection of the Constitutional System and the Fight against Terrorism – chiefs: Alexey Sedov (since March 2006), Alexander Bragin (2004 – March 2006), Alexander Zhdankov (2001 - 2004), German Ugryumov (2000-2001)
    • Directorate for Terrorism and Political Extremism Control – chiefs: Mikhail Belousov, before him Grafov, before the latter Boris Mylnikov (since 2000)
  • Federal Protection Service of the Russian Federation – Director: General of Army Yevgeniy Alekseevich Murov (from 8 May 2000)[29]
    • President's regiment in the Service of Commendant of the Moscow Kremlin of the Federal Security Service of Russia[30] (Template:Lang-ru) stationed in Kremlin. Was created on 8 April 1936 as a Special Purpose regiment (SpetsNaz) for the seurity of the Kremlin Garrison.
  • Economic Security Service (Department) – chiefs: Alexander Bortnikov (since 2 March 2004), Yury Zaostrovtsev (January 2000 – March 2004), Viktor Ivanov (April 1999 – January 2000), Nikolay Patrushev (1998 – April 1999), Alexander Grigoryev (28 August – 1 October 1998).
  • Operational Information and International Relations Service (Analysis, Forecasting, and Strategic Planning Department) – chiefs: Viktor Komogorov (since 1999), Sergei Ivanov (1998-1999)
  • Organizational and Personnel Service (Department) – chiefs: Yevgeny Lovyrev (since 2001), Yevgeny Solovyov (before Lovyrev)
  • Department for Activity Provision – chiefs: Mikhail Shekin (since September 2006), Sergey Shishin (before Shekin), Pyotr Pereverzev (as of 2004), Alexander Strelkov (before Pereverzev)
  • Border Guard Service – chiefs: Vladimir Pronichev (since 2003)
  • Control Service – chiefs: Alexander Zhdankov (since 2004)
    • Inspection Directorate – chiefs: Vladimir Anisimov (2004-May 2005), Rashid Nurgaliyev (12 July 2000 - 2002),
    • Internal Security Directorate – chiefs: Alexander Kupryazhkin (until September 2006), Sergei Shishin (before Kupryazhkin since December 2002), Sergei Smirnov (April 1999 – December 2002), Viktor Ivanov (1998 – Aril 1999), Nikolay Patrushev (1994-1998)
  • Science and Engineering Service (Department) – chiefs: Nikolai Klimashin
  • Investigation Directorate – chiefs: Nikolay Oleshko (since December 2004), Yury Anisimov (as of 2004), Viktor Milchenko (since 2002), Sergey Balashov (until 2002 since at least 2001), Vladimir Galkin (as of 1997 and 1998)

Besides the services (departments) and directorates of the federal office, the territorial directorates of FSB in the federal subects are also subordinate to it.

Of these, St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate of FSB and its predecessors (historically covering both Leningrad/Saint Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast) have played especially important roles in the history of this organization, as many of the officers of the Directorate, including Vladimir Putin and Nikolay Patrushev, later assumed important positions within the federal FSB office or other government bodies. After the last Chief of the Soviet time, Anatoly Kurkov, the St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast Directorate were led by Sergei Stepashin (29 November 1991 - 1992), Viktor Cherkesov (1992 –1998), Alexander Grigoryev (1 October 1998 – 5 January 2001), Sergei Smirnov (5 January 2001 – June 2003), Alexander Bortnikov (June 2003 – March 2004) and Yury Ignashchenkov (since March 2004).

Heads of the FSB[]

On 20 June 1996, Boris Yeltsin fired FSB Director Mikhail Barsukov and appointed Nikolay Kovalyov as acting Director and later Director of the FSB.

  • Nikolai Golushko, December 1993 - February 1994
  • Sergei Stepashin, February 1994 - June 1995
  • Mikhail Barsukov, July 1995 - June 1996
  • Nikolai Kovalev, July 1996 - July 1998
  • Vladimir Putin, July 1998 - August 1999
  • Nikolai Patrushev, August 1999 - 12 May 2008
  • Aleksandr Bortnikov, since 12 May 2008


Anna Politkovskaya, Yuri Felshtinski, Alexander Litvinenko, Ion Mihai Pacepa Yulia Latynina and some others claim that the FSB is engaged in suppression of internal dissent, bringing the entire population of Russia under total control, and influencing important political events, just as the KGB did in the past. To achieve these goals, it is said the FSB implements mass surveillance and a variety of active measures, including disinformation, propaganda through the state-controlled mass media, provocations, and persecution of opposition politicians, investigative journalists, and dissidents.[31][32][33][34][35][36][37][38]

Some observers note that FSB is more powerful than KGB was, because it does not operate under the control of the Communist Party as KGB did in the past.[39] According to Ion Mihai Pacepa, "In the Soviet Union, the KGB was a state within a state. Now former KGB officers are running the state. They have custody of the country’s 6,000 nuclear weapons, entrusted to the KGB in the 1950s, and they now also manage the strategic oil industry renationalized by Putin. The KGB successor, rechristened FSB, still has the right to electronically monitor the population, control political groups, search homes and businesses, infiltrate the federal government, create its own front enterprises, investigate cases, and run its own prison system. The Soviet Union had one KGB officer for every 428 citizens. Putin’s Russia has one FSB-ist for every 297 citizens."[40]

Peter Finn of the Washington Post argues that the FSB is now the leading political force in Russia, which simply replaced the Communist Party.[3]


The FSB has the power to enter any home or business without a search warrant if there is sufficient reason to believe that "a crime has been, or is being, committed there".[41][42] Article 24 of the law exempts the agency from certain oversight by Russia’s Public Prosecutor.[6]

Human rights activists have claimed that the FSB has been slow to shed its KGB heritage, and there have been allegations that it has manufactured cases against suspected dissidents and used threats to recruit agents. At the end of the 1990s, critics charged that the FSB had attempted to frame Russian academics involved in joint research with Western arms-control experts.[43]

Despite early promises to reform the Russian intelligence community, the FSB and the services that collect foreign intelligence and signals intelligence (the SVR and the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information) remained largely unreformed and subject to little legislative or judicial scrutiny.[44] Although some limits were placed on the FSB's domestic surveillance activitiesTemplate:Ndash for example, spying on religious institutions and charitable organizations was reducedTemplate:Ndash all the services continued to be controlled by KGB veterans schooled under the old regime.[44] Moreover, few former KGB officers were removed following the agency's dissolution, and little effort was made to examine the KGB's operations or its use of informants.[45]

1999 Russian apartment bombings[]

Main article: Russian apartment bombings

Starting from 1998, people from state security services came to power as Prime Ministers of Russia: a KGB veteran Yevgeny Primakov; former FSB Director Sergei Stepashin; and finally former FSB Director Vladimir Putin who was appointed in 8 August 1999.

In 7 August, separatist guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev began an incursion into Dagestan leading to the start of the Dagestan War. (Basayev had been training in Russian GRU before the First Chechen War, during the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.[46][47][48]

On 4 September, a series of four Russian apartment bombings began. On the night of 22-23 September, another bomb was found in an apartment building in Ryazan.[49] However, according to a senior Russian security official, the "bomb" was a dummy device placed there as part of a security exercise.[50] According to the head of FSB Nikolai Patrushev, the exercise was carried out to test responses after the earlier blasts. Mr Patrushev said similar exercises were being conducted in other Russian cities.[50] FSB issued a public apology about the incident.[51].

The Second Chechen War, which had been launched on 26 August as a response to the failed Invasion of Dagestan by Chechen warlords in early August, was intensified after the bombings. The war made Prime Minister Vladimir Putin very popular, although he was previously unknown to the public, and helped him to win a landslide victory in the presidential elections on 26 March 2000. Boris Berezovsky claimed, that the bombings were organized by the FSB to bring Vladimir Putin to power. One of Putin's Special Advisor decided to act against Berezovsky to protect Vladimir Putin regarding public opinion; the result was the forfeiture of his industrial empire. According to former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko and journalist David Satter, a Johns Hopkins University and Hoover Institute scholar, this was a successful coup d'état organized by the FSB to bring Vladimir Putin to power.[52][53] Litvinenko's and Felstinsky's book was sponsored by Berezovsky. All attempts to independently investigate the Russian apartment bombings were unsuccessful. Vice-chairman of the Sergei Kovalev commission created to investigate the bombings, Sergei Yushenkov, was assassinated. Another member of this commission Yuri Shchekochikhin died allegedly from poisoning by thallium. Investigator Mikhail Trepashkin, former FSB officer hired by relatives of victims was arrested and convicted by Russian authorities for allegedly disclosing state secrets. Researchers such as Gordon Bennett, Vlad Sobell, Robert Bruce Ware, Mike Bowker, and Richard Sakwa have criticized the conspiracy theories, pointing out that the theories' proponents have provided little evidence to support them, and also that the theory ignores the history of Chechen terrorism and threats made by the militants before the bombings.[49][54][55][56][57] Others, such as Paul Klebnikov, Peter Reddaway and Paul J. Murphy, take involvement of Wahhabi terrorists as the most likely explanation for the attacks.[58][59][60]

FSB as ruling political elite[]

According to former Russian Duma member Konstantin Borovoi, "Putin's appointment is the culmination of the KGB's crusade for power. This is its finale. Now the KGB runs the country."[61] Olga Kryshtanovskaya, director of the Moscow-based Center for the Study of Elites, has found that up to 78% of 1,016 leading political figures in Russia have served previously in organizations affiliated with KGB or FSB.[3] She said: "If in the Soviet period and the first post-Soviet period, the KGB and FSB people were mainly involved in security issues, now half are still involved in security but the other half are involved in [business, political parties, NGOs, regional governments, even culture... They started to use all political institutions."[3] This situation is very similar to that of the former Soviet Union where all key positions in the government were occupied by members of the Communist Party. The KGB or FSB members usually remain in the "acting reserve" even if they formally leave the organization ("acting reserve" members receive second FSB salary, follow FSB instructions, and remain "above the law" being protected by the organization, according to Kryshtanovskaya).[62] GRU defector and writer Victor Suvorov explained that members of Russian security services can leave such organizations only in a coffin, because they know too much. Soon after becoming prime minister of Russia, Putin also claimed that "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission."[61]

The idea of the KGB acting as a leading political force rather than a security organization has been discussed by historian Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov,[63] journalist John Barron, writer and former GRU officer Victor Suvorov, retired KGB Major General Oleg Kalugin,[64] and Evgenia Albats. According to Avtorkhanov, "It is not true that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party is a superpower... An absolute power thinks, acts and dictates for all of us. The name of the powerTemplate:Ndash NKVDTemplate:Ndash MVDTemplate:Ndash MGB. ...Chekism in ideology, Chekism in practice. Chekism from top to bottom."[63]

According to Albats, most KGB leaders, including Lavrenty Beria, Yuri Andropov, and Vladimir Kryuchkov, have always struggled for the power with the Communist Party and manipulated the communist leaders. Moreover, FSB has formal membership, military discipline, an extensive network of civilian informants,[2] hardcore ideology, and support of population (60% of Russians trust FSB),[65] which makes it a perfect totalitarian political party.[66] However the FSB party does not advertise its leading role because the secrecy is an important advantage.

With regard to death of Aleksander Litvinenko, the highest-ranking Soviet Bloc intelligence defector, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa stated that there is "a band of over 6,000 former officers of the KGBTemplate:Ndash one of the most criminal organizations in historyTemplate:Ndash who grabbed the most important positions in the federal and local governments, and who are perpetuating Stalin’s, Khrushchev’s, and Brezhnev’s practice of secretly assassinating people who stand in their way."[67]

Suppression of internal dissent[]

Many Russian opposition lawmakers and investigative journalists have been assassinated while investigating corruption and alleged crimes conducted by FSB and state authorities: Sergei Yushenkov, ‎Yuri Shchekochikhin, Galina Starovoitova, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, Paul Klebnikov, Nadezhda Chaikova, Nina Yefimova, and many others.[2][68][69] KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky believes that murders of writers Yuri Shchekochikhin (author of "Slaves of KGB"[70]), Anna Politkovskaya, and Alexander Litvinenko show that FSB has returned to the practice of political assassinations[71] which were conducted in the past by the Thirteenth KGB Department.[72]

Political dissidents from the former Soviet republics, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, are often arrested by FSB and extradited to these countries for prosecution, despite protests from international human rights organizations.[73][74] Special services of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan also kidnap people at the Russian territory, with the implicit approval of FSB.[75]

Criticism of anti-terrorist operations[]

According to Anna Politkovskaya, most of the "Islamic terrorism cases" were fabricated by the government, and the confessions have been obtained through the torture of innocent suspects. "The plight of those sentenced for Islamic terrorism today is the same as that of the political prisoners of the Gulag Archipelago... Russia continues to be infected by Stalinism", she said.[76]

Alleged involvement in terrorist acts[]

Some journalists and workers of international NGOs were allegedly kidnapped by FSB-affiliated forces in Chechnya who pretended to be Chechen terrorists: Arjan Erkel, Ali Astamirov.[77]

Alleged involvement in organized crime[]

Former FSB officer Aleksander Litvinenko accused FSB personnel of involvement in organized crime, such as drug trafficking and contract killings.[78] It was noted that FSB, far from being a reliable instrument in the fight against organized crime, is institutionally a part of the problem, due not only to its co-optation and penetration by criminal elements, but to its own absence of a legal bureaucratic culture and use of crime as an instrument of state policy.[79]

International affairs[]

FSB collaborates very closely with secret police services from some former Soviet Republics, especially Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.[80][81] The FSB is accused of working to undermine governments of Baltic states[81] and Georgia.[82]

Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, Richard Butler, found that many Russian state-controlled companies, like Ekkoil, managed by the Prince Vincent BlagoÏevitch Golitsyne; were involved in the Oil-for-Food Programme-related fraud. As a part of this affair, former FSB Director Yevgeny Primakov had received large kickbacks from Saddam Hussein according to Butler.[83] The KGB, FSB and Russian government had very close relationships with Saddam Hussein and Iraqi Intelligence Service Mukhabarat according to Yossef Bodansky, the Director of Research of the International Strategic Studies Association.

See also[]

  • Chronology of Soviet secret police agencies
  • Numbers station, shortwave radio stations of uncertain origin thought to broadcast coded messages
  • OMON, special units of Russian police
  • SVR, Russia's primary foreign intelligence agency
  • Federal Protective Service, government protection agency
  • FAPSI, Russia's main electronic and signals intelligence agency
  • SORM, law that allows the FSB to monitor communications
  • Active measures, a form of Soviet political warfare
  • Three Whales Corruption Scandal, 2000

Further reading[]

  • Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, and Geoffrey Andrews. Blowing up Russia : Terror from within. 2002. ISBN 1-56171-938-2
  • Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia--Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5.
  • David Satter. Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State. Yale University Press. 2003. ISBN 0-300-09892-8.


Template:Citation style

  1. Presidential Edict No. 314, O sisteme i strukture federalnykh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti, 9 March 2004; in Rossiyskaya gazeta, [1], 12 March 2004.
  2. 2.0 2.1 2.2 Slaves of KGB. 20th Century. The religion of betrayal (Рабы ГБ. XX век. Религия предательства), by Yuri Shchekochikhin Moscow, 1999.
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens - by P. Finn — Washington Post, 2006
  4. THE MILITARY AND THE AUGUST 1991 COUP McNair Paper 34, The Russian Military's Role in Politics, January 1995.
  5. Template:Cite book
  6. 6.0 6.1 On Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation Russian Federation Federal Law No. 40-FZ. Adopted by the State Duma 22 February 1995. Signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin and dated 3 April 1995.
  7. Mark Tran. Who is Vladimir Putin? Profile: Russia's new prime minister. Guardian Unlimited 9 August 1999.
  8. FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far between
  9. Фсб Закрытого Типа
  10. Mass Dismissals at the FSB - Kommersant Moscow
  11. Ъ - Кит и меч
  12. 12.0 12.1 12.2 Counterintelligence Cases- by
  13. 13.0 13.1 Story to the Day of Checkist - by Vladimir Voronov, for, December 2006.
  14. Case study: Igor Sutiagin
  15. AAAS Human Rights Action Network
  16. Russian Scientist Charged With Disclosing State Secret
  17. Oskar Kaibyshev convicted
  18. Researchers Throw Up Their Arms
  19. Trepashkin case
  20. Russia: 'Phallic' Case Threatens Internet Freedom
  21. Grigory Pasko site
  22. The Pasko case
  23. Russia Used 'Deception' To Kill Maskhadov, 8 March 2006 (RFE/RL)
  24. Template:Cite news
  25. Template:Cite news
  26. Template:Cite news
  27. Putin Calls On FSB To Modernize Border Guards by Victor Yasmann for Radio Free Europe, December 2005.
  28. "Status of the State Licensing System of Control over Exports of Nuclear Materials, Dual-use Commodities and Technologies in Russia: Manual for foreign associates in Russia," International Business Relations Corporation, Department of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Cycle (Moscow, 2002).
  29. Murov biography (in Russian)
  30. Президентский полк
  31. The Perils of Putinism, By Arnold Beichman, Washington Times, 11 February 2007
  32. Putinism On the March, by George F. Will, Washington Post, 30 November 2004
  33. The Essence of Putinism: The Strengthening of the Privatized State by Dmitri Glinski Vassiliev, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2000
  34. What is ‘Putinism’?, by Andranik Migranyan, Russia in Global affairs, 13 April 2004
  35. Putinism: highest stage of robber capitalism, by Andrei Piontkovsky, The Russia Journal, 7-13 February 2000. The title is an allusion to work "Imperialism as the last and culminating stage of capitalism" by Vladimir Lenin
  36. Review of Andrei's Pionkovsky's Another Look Into Putin's Soul by the Honorable Rodric Braithwaite, Hoover Institute
  37. Andrei Illarionov: Approaching Zimbabwe (Russian) - Partial English translation
  38. Russia After The Presidential Election by Mark A. Smith Conflict Studies Research Centre
  39. Symposium: KGB Resurrection, interview with Vladimir Bukovsky, Ion Mihai Pacepa, and R. James Woolsey, Jr.,, 30 April 2004.
  40. Symposium: When an Evil Empire Returns, interview with Ion Mihai Pacepa, R. James Woolsey, Jr., Yuri Yarim-Agaev, and Lt. Gen. Tom McInerney,, 23 June 2006.
  41. Aleksandr Platkovskiy, "Pod novoy vyveskoy vozrozhdayetsya staroe KGB," Izvestiya, 18 March 1995, pp. 1-2
  42. "Russia, Keeps Getting Back," Economist, 15 April 1995, pp. 51-52.
  43. Peter Finn. In Russia, A Secretive Force Widens Washington Post, 12 December 2006.
  44. 44.0 44.1 FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far between Agentura.Ru
  46. Western leaders betray Aslan Maskhadov - by Andre Glucksmann. Prima-News, 11 March 2005
  47. CHECHEN PARLIAMENTARY SPEAKER: BASAEV WAS G.R.U. OFFICER The Jamestown Foundation, 8 September 2006
  48. Analysis: Has Chechnya's Strongman Signed His Own Death Warrant? - by Liz Fuller, RFE/RL, 1 March 2005
  49. 49.0 49.1 Template:Cite book
  50. 50.0 50.1 Ryazan 'bomb' was security service exercise
  51. Russian Says Kremlin Faked 'Terror Attacks'
  52. Yuri Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, and Geoffrey Andrews. Blowing up Russia: Terror from within. New York 2002. ISBN 1-56171-938-2.
  53. David Satter. Darkness at Dawn: The Rise of the Russian Criminal State. Yale University Press. 2003. ISBN 0-300-09892-8.
  54. Vladimir Putin & Russia's Special Services Gordon Bennet, 2002
  55. Western treatment of Russia signifies erosion of reason Dr. Vlad Sobell, 2007. The same article at Russia Profile
  56. Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel: Russian Presidential Election – Affirming Democracy or Confirming Autocracy?
  57. Template:Cite book
  58. Paul Klebnikov. Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism
  59. Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development
  60. Template:Cite book
  61. 61.0 61.1 The KGB Rises Again in Russia - by R.C. Paddock - Los Angeles Times, 12 January 2000
  62. Interview with Olga Kryshtanovskaya (Russian) "Siloviks in power: fears or reality?" by Evgenia Albats, Echo of Moscow, 4 February 2006
  63. 63.0 63.1 "Idea which is worth of dying for it", The Chechen Times №17, 30.08.2003
  64. The Triumph of the KGB by retired KGB Major General Oleg D. Kalugin The Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies
  65. Archives explosion by Maksim Artemiev,, 22 December 2006
  66. Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia--Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5.
  67. The Kremlin’s Killing Ways - by Ion Mihai Pacepa, National Review Online, 28 November 2006
  68. Amnesty International condemns the political murder of Russian human rights advocate Galina Starovoitova
  69. Yushenkov: A Russian idealist
  70. «Рабы ГБ. XX век. Религия предательства»
  71. Бывший резидент КГБ Олег Гордиевский не сомневается в причастности к отравлению Литвиненко российских спецслужб -
  72. *Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West, Gardners Books (2000), ISBN 0-14-028487-7
  73. "An oppositioner was transferred to Rakhmonov" by Irina Borogan - Novaya Gazeta
  74. FSB serves to Islam - by Aleksander Podrabinek - Novaya Gazeta
  75. "Special services of former Soviet republics at the Russian territory" - by Andrei Soldatov - Novaya Gazeta (Russian)
  76. Stalinism Forever - by Anna Politkovskaya - The Washington Post
  77. Special services of delivery (Russian) - by Vyacheslav Ismailov, Novaya Gazeta 27 January 2005
  78. A. Litvinenko and A. Goldfarb. Gang from Lubyanka Template:Ru icon GRANI, New York, 2002. ISBN 0-9723878-0-3. Full book in Russian
  79. Russia's Great Criminal Revolution: The Role of the Security Services - by J. M. Waller and V. J. Yasmann, Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1995.
  80. Special services of the former Soviet Union work in Russian Federation (Russian) - by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Dorogan, Novaya Gazeta, 27 February 2006.
  81. 81.0 81.1 Special services of Russian Federation work in the former Soviet Union (Russian) - by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Dorogan, Novaya Gazeta, 27 March 2006.
  82. Moscow Accused of Backing Georgian Revolt - by Olga Allenova and Vladimir Novikov, Kommersant, 7 Sep. 2006.
  83. Arms Aide Who Quit Assails U.N. on Iraq - New York Times

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